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10.1 Motivation
This paper studies the impact of corruption on a country’s composition
of capital inﬂows. The importance of this composition was recently high-
lighted by the currency crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America. Sev-
eral studies (starting with Frankel and Rose 1996 and followed by Radelet
and Sachs 1998 and Rodrik and Velasco 1999) have shown that the compo-
sition of international capital inﬂows correlates to the incidence of currency
crises. In particular, three types of composition measures have been high-
lighted in the literature as being particularly relevant to the discussion of
currency crises: (a) the lower the share of foreign direct investment in total
capital inﬂows, (b) the higher the short-term debt-reserves ratio, or (c) the
higher the share of foreign currency–denominated borrowing in a country’s
total borrowing, the more likely a currency crisis becomes.
In this paper, we will discuss all three dimensions of the composition of
capital ﬂows, but with a greater emphasis on the foreign direct investment
(FDI) share in total capital inﬂows, as we have a larger set of observations
and more reliable measure in this area. We will explain this later. One pos-
sible reason that a low FDI share in total capital ﬂow is associated with a
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small (unfavorable) change in the recipient countries’ fundamentals may
cause a large swing in the portfolio capital ﬂows (e.g., from massive inﬂows
to massive outﬂows). This can strain the recipient country’s currency or ﬁ-
nancial system suﬃciently to cause or exacerbate its collapse (Radelet and
Sachs 1998; Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Reisen 1999).
There are at least two views on the causes of crises. On the one hand, it is
increasingly common to hear the assertion that so-called crony capitalism
may be partly responsible for the onset or the depth of a crisis. Direct sta-
tistical evidence for this hypothesis is still sparse, with the notable exception
of Johnson et al. (2000).1 On the other hand, many researchers argue that
(fragile) self-fulﬁlling expectations by international creditors are the real
reason for the currency crisis. Crony capitalism and self-fulﬁlling expecta-
tions are typically presented as rival explanations.
In fact, the two hypotheses may be linked. The extent of corruption in a
country may aﬀect that country’s composition of capital inﬂows in a way that
makes it more vulnerable to international creditors’ shifts in expectations.
In a narrow sense of the word, corruption refers to the extent to which
ﬁrms (or private citizens) must bribe government oﬃcials in their interac-
tions (for permits, licenses, loans, and so forth).2 However, we prefer to
think of corruption more broadly as shorthand for poor public governance,
which can include not only bureaucratic corruption, but also deviations
from rule of law or excessive and arbitrary government regulations. All the
existing empirical indicators of the diﬀerent dimensions of public gover-
nance are so highly correlated that we do not think that we can separately
identify their eﬀects at this stage.
A small number of previous papers have looked at the eﬀect of corrup-
tion on FDI. Mixing corruption with twelve other variables to form a com-
posite indicator, Wheeler and Mody (1992) failed to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant rela-
tion between corruption and foreign investment. However, the insigniﬁcant
result may be due to a high noise-to-signal ratio in the composite indicator.
Using U.S. outward investment to individual countries, Hines (1995) did
ﬁnd that foreign investment is negatively related to host country corruption,
which he interpreted as evidence of the eﬀect of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Using a matrix of bilateral international direct investment
from twelve source countries to forty-ﬁve host countries, Wei (2000a) found
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1. For surveys of the literature on corruption and economic development, see Bardhan
(1997), Kaufmann (1997), and Wei (1999). More recent papers on corruption include Wei
(2000d) and Bai and Wei (2000). None of the surveys covers any empirical study that links
crony capitalism with currency crises.
2. We use the term crony capitalisminterchangeably with corruption.Strictly speaking, crony
capitalism refers to an economic environment in which relatives and friends of government
oﬃcials are placed in positions of power and government decisions on allocation of resources
are distorted to favor friends and relatives. In reality, crony capitalism almost always implies a
widespread corruption, because private ﬁrms and citizens in such an environment ﬁnd it nec-
essary to pay bribes to government oﬃcials in order to get anything done.that the behavior of the FDI ﬂows from the United States and those from
other source countries, with respect to host country corruption, is not sta-
tistically diﬀerent. More importantly, however, corruption not only has a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, but it also has an economi-
cally large eﬀect on inward FDI. For example, in a benchmark estimation,
an increase in corruption from the level of Singapore to that of Mexico
would have the same negative eﬀect on inward foreign investment as raising
the marginal corporate tax by 50 percentage points. Using ﬁrm-level data,
Smarzynska and Wei (2000) found that host country corruption induces
foreign investors to favor joint ventures (over wholly owned ﬁrms).
None of the above papers has a measure of government policies toward
FDI. Such data are not readily available. The current paper employs two
new indexes of government policies toward FDI that are compiled from in-
vestment guides for individual countries produced by Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (2000). Although FDI is an important element of this study, the
main focus is the eﬀect of corruption on the composition of capital inﬂows
(FDI versus borrowing from foreign banks, in particular). We are not aware
of any studies that have examined this question except for Wei (2000b). This
paper extends the previous paper in several ways. While Wei focuses on the
connection between the ratio of bank loan to FDI and corruption, and bases
the analysis on bilateral data, this paper also checks the relative share of port-
folio ﬂows versus FDI as well as using more aggregate data from the balance
of payments reported by the countries to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). In addition, we report results on a possible relationship between cor-
ruption and the maturity structure of foreign borrowing, and between cor-
ruption and a country’s ability to borrow internationally in its own currency.
Before we proceed to a more formal analysis, it may be useful to have a
quick glance at the data. The argument that capital ﬂow composition matters
requires that diﬀerent capital ﬂows have a diﬀerent level of volatility. For
every member country of the IMF for which relevant data are available for
1980–96, we compute the standard deviations of three ratios (portfolio capi-
tal inﬂow to GDP, borrowing from banks to GDP, and inward FDI to GDP).3
The results are summarized in the upper half of table 10.1 and visually pre-
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3. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) argue that the classiﬁcation of capital inﬂows
into FDI and other forms may not be accurate and that it is possible for a reversal of an inﬂow
of FDI to take the form of an outﬂow of bank loans or portfolio ﬂows. As a result, calculations
of relative volatility of the diﬀerent forms of capital ﬂows are not meaningful. We hold a diﬀer-
ent view. The misclassiﬁcation can come from two sources: random measurement errors and
intentional misreporting by international investors. In the ﬁrst instance, if capital ﬂows are
misclassiﬁed at the margin due to random errors, the labels on FDI and other forms of capital
ﬂows are still useful. In the second instance, foreign investors may intentionally misreport
types of capital ﬂows. Because there is a cost associated with misreporting, there is a limit on
the magnitude of the error of this type as well. In the empirical work to be presented later in
the paper, the bilateral FDI data are based on FDI source country governments’ survey of
their ﬁrms. The bilateral bank lending data are based on international lending banks’ report-
ing to their governments (which then forward them to the Bank for International Settlements).
There are no obvious incentives for multinational ﬁrms or international banks to misreport
their true FDI or loan positions to their governments.Table 10.1 Volatility of FDI/GDP, Bank Loan/GDP, and Portfolio Flow/GDP
(1980–96)
FDI-GDP Loan-GDP Portfolio-GDP
A. As Measured by Standard Deviation
Whole samplea
Mean 0.012 0.041 0.014
Median 0.008 0.033 0.009
Emerging marketsb
Mean 0.012 0.046 0.012
Median 0.008 0.035 0.004
OECDc
Mean 0.008 0.020 0.021
Median 0.007 0.014 0.020
Selected countries
Indonesia 0.007 0.017 0.009
Korea 0.002 0.037 0.014
Malaysia 0.023 0.034 0.023
Mexico 0.007 0.033 0.026
The Philippines 0.009 0.026 0.017
Thailand 0.007 0.028 0.012
B. As Measured by Coefﬁcient of Variation
Whole samplea
Mean 1.176 1.567 2.764
Median 0.947 1.204 1.702
Emerging marketsb
Mean 1.269 2.192 0.813
Median 1.163 1.177 2.042
OECDc,d
Mean 0.737 –1.353 8.508
Median 0.595 1.530 1.004
Selected countries
Indonesia 0.820 0.717 1.722
Korea 0.591 2.039 1.338
Malaysia 0.490 4.397 3.544
Mexico 0.452 2.048 2.088
The Philippines 0.921 0.956 1.979
Thailand 0.571 0.629 1.137
Sources: Total inward FDI ﬂows, total bank loans, and total inward portfolio investments are
from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics CD-ROM; GDP data are from the World
Bank’s GDF and WDI central database.
Notes: Only countries having at least eight nonmissing observations during 1980–96 for all
three variables, and having populations greater than or equal to one million in 1995, are kept
in the sample. OECD countries (with membership up to 1980) include the following: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. “Emerging markets” are all countries not on the previous list and having a GDP




dIn the case of the volatility of the loan-GDP ratio for the OECD countries, the large differ-
ence between the mean and median (–1.353 vs. 1.530) is driven by one outlier (Japan, with a
value of –49).sented in ﬁgure 10.1. For all countries in the sample (103 countries in total),
the volatility of FDI-GDP ratio is substantially smaller than the loan-GDP
ratio and somewhat smaller than the ratio of portfolio ﬂows to GDP. For the
non–Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries as a group, the FDI-GDP ratio is also much less volatile than the
loan-GDP ratio, although its median is higher than the portfolio ﬂow to GDP
ratio. The lower part of the same half of the table presents the volatility of the
three ratios for a number of individual countries that featured prominently in
the recent currency crises. Each country shows a loan-GDP ratio that is at
least twice and as much as ﬁfteen times as volatile as the FDI-GDP ratio. For
each of these countries, the portfolio capital to GDP ratio is also more vola-
tile than the FDI-GDP ratio. If the sample period is extended to include
1997–98, the diﬀerences in volatility would be even more pronounced (not
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Fig. 10.1 Relative volatility of diﬀerent capital ﬂows: A, Standard deviations over
1980–96 emerging markets: 85 countries; B, Standard deviations over 1980–96.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
A
Breported). Alternatively, we may look at the coeﬃcient of variation (standard
deviation divided by the mean) of these three ratios. These results are pre-
sented in the lower half of table 10.1. Again, for the group of emerging-market
economies, FDI-GDP is less volatile than the loan-FDI ratio according to
this measure. On the other hand, FDI-GDP is less volatile than the portfolio-
GDP ratio according to the median, but not the mean, of the group. There-
fore, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that FDI is less sentiment-
driven and hence more stable as a source of foreign capital.4
Corruption is bad for both international direct investors and creditors.
Corrupt borrowing countries are more likely to default on bank loans or to
nationalize (or otherwise diminish the value of) the assets of foreign direct
investors. When this happens, there is a limit on how much international ar-
bitration or court proceedings can help to recover the assets, as there is a
limit on how much collateral the foreign creditors or direct investors can
seize as compensation.5
One may argue that domestic investors have an informational advantage
over international investors. Among international investors, international
direct investors may have an informational advantage over international
portfolio investors (and presumably banks). International direct investors
could obtain more information about the local market by having managers
from the headquarters stationed in the country that they invest in. As a con-
sequence, the existence of cross-border informational asymmetry may lead
to a bias in favor of international direct investment. This is the logic under-
lying Razin, Sadka, and Yuen’s (1998) theory of a “pecking order of inter-
national capital ﬂows.” However, the existence of corruption could temper
this eﬀect. The need for international investors to pay bribery and deal with
extortion by corrupt bureaucrats tends to increase with the frequency and
the extent of their interactions with local bureaucrats. Given that interna-
tional direct investors are more likely to have repeated interactions with
local oﬃcials (for permits, taxes, health inspections, and so forth) than in-
ternational banks or portfolio investors, local corruption would be more
detrimental to FDI than other forms of capital ﬂows. Likewise, direct in-
vestment involves greater sunk cost than bank loans or portfolio investment.
Once an investment is made, when corrupt local oﬃcials begin to demand
bribes not to set up obstacles, direct investors would be in a weaker bargain-
ing position than international banks or portfolio investors. This ex post dis-
advantage of FDI would make international direct investors more cautious
ex ante in a corrupt host country than international portfolio investors.6
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4. The pattern reported here is the opposite of that in Dooley, Claessens, and Warner (1995).
5. In the old days, major international creditors and direct investors might rely on their
navies to invade defaulting countries to seize more collateral. Such is no longer a (ready) op-
tion today.
6. Tornell (1990) presented a model in which a combination of uncertainty and sunk cost in
real investment leads to underinvestment in real projects even when the inﬂow of ﬁnancial cap-
ital is abundant.There is a second reason that international direct investment is deterred
more by local corruption than international bank credit or portfolio in-
vestment. The current international ﬁnancial architecture is such that in-
ternational creditors are more likely to be bailed out than international di-
rect investors. For example, during the Mexican and subsequent Tequila
crises and the more recent Asian currency crisis, the IMF, the World Bank,
and the Group of Seven (G7) countries mobilized a large amount of funds
for these countries to prevent or minimize the potentially massive defaults
on bank loans. Thus, an international bailout of the bank loans in an event
of a massive crisis has by now been ﬁrmly implanted in market expectations.
(In addition, many developing country governments implicitly or explicitly
guarantee the loans borrowed by the private sector in the country.7) In con-
trast, there have been no comparable examples of international assistance
packages for the recovery of nationalized or extorted assets of foreign direct
investors except for an insigniﬁcant amount of insurance, which is often ex-
pensive to acquire. This diﬀerence further tilts the composition of capital
ﬂows and makes banks more willing than direct investors to do business
with corrupt countries.
Both reasons suggest the possibility that corruption may aﬀect the com-
position of capital inﬂows in such a way that the country is more likely to
experience a currency crisis. Of course, the composition of capital ﬂows af-
fects economic development in ways that go beyond its eﬀect on the propen-
sity for a currency crisis. Indeed, many would argue that attracting FDI as
opposed to international bank loans or portfolio investment is a more use-
ful way to transfer technology and managerial know-how.
As some concrete examples, table 10.2 shows the total amount of inward
FDI, foreign bank loans, portfolio capital inﬂows, and their ratios for New
Zealand, Singapore, Uruguay, and Thailand. Figure 10.2 summarizes the
comparison by pie charts. On the one hand, New Zealand and Singapore
(are perceived to) have relatively low corruption (the exact source is ex-
plained in the next section) and relatively low loan-FDI and portfolio in-
vestment-FDI ratios. On the other hand, Uruguay and Thailand (are per-
ceived to) have relatively high corruption and relatively high loan-FDI and
portfolio investment to FDI ratios. These examples, then, are consistent
with the notion that local corruption correlates to patterns of capital in-
ﬂows. Of course, these four countries are merely examples. Consequently,
there are two questions that must be addressed more formally. First, does the
association between corruption and composition of capital ﬂows generalize
beyond these four countries? Second, after we control for a number of other
characteristics that aﬀect the composition of capital inﬂows, will we still ﬁnd
the positive association between corruption and the loan-FDI ratio?
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7. McKinnon and Pill (1996, 1999) argue that the government guarantee generates moral
hazard, which in turn leads the developing countries to overborrow from the international
credit market.Aside from measuring composition of capital inﬂows in terms of the rel-
ative share of the FDI versus non-FDI, two other compositions of capital
ﬂows have been suggested to be relevant in discussing currency crises. The
ﬁrst is the term structure of foreign borrowing. It has been suggested that
the higher the share of short-term borrowing in a country’s total borrow-
ing, the more likely the country may run into a future crisis (Rodrik and Ve-
lasco 1999). The second is the currency denomination of the foreign bor-
rowing. It has been hypothesized that the greater the share of international
borrowing that is denominated in a hard currency (most often the U.S. dol-
lar), the more likely a country may run into a future crisis. In this connec-
tion, the inability of a country to borrow internationally in its own currency
(which would have reduced the probability of a crisis) has been termed
“original sin” (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias 2000). The limitation of
the data places a more severe constraint on measuring well these two com-
positions of international borrowing. Nonetheless, in the later part of the
paper, we will also report some preliminary ﬁndings regarding possible
links between corruption and these measures of the composition of foreign
borrowing.
We organize the rest of the paper in the following way. Section 10.2 de-
scribes the data. Section 10.3 presents the methodology and the statistical
results of the analyses, and Section 10.4 concludes.
10.2 Data
The key components of international capital ﬂows in the empirical inves-
tigation are bilateral direct investment and bilateral bank loans. To our
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Table 10.2 Quality of Public Governance and the Composition of Capital Inﬂows
New Zealand Singapore Uruguay Thailand
Corruption 0.6 0.9 5.7 7.0
(TI index) (less corrupt) (more corrupt)
Ratios (averaged over 1994–96)
Loan-FDI 0.11 0.44 1.77 5.77
Portfolio-FDI 0.07 0.09 1.40 1.76
Absolute amount (averaged over 
1994–96)
Loan 920 10,500 794 2,500
Portfolio 610 2,200 627 761
FDI 8,400 23,600 448 432
Source: Total inward loans, portfolio investment, and FDI are from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Sta-
tistics CD-ROM.
Notes: To minimize the impact of the year-to-year ﬂuctuation, the reported numbers are averaged over
1994–96. The corruption index is explained in appendix B. “Absolute amount” is the amount the three
inﬂows in millions of U.S. dollars.Fig. 10.2 Quality of public governance and the composition of capital inﬂows
Source: Authors’ calculations.knowledge, other forms of capital ﬂows are not available on a bilateral ba-
sis for a broad set of capital-exporting countries examined in this paper.
The bilateral FDI data are an average over three years (1994–96) of the
stock of FDI from eighteen source countries to ﬁfty-nine host countries.
Table 10.3presents a list of all source and host countries in our sample. The
data come from the OECD’s International Direct Investment 1998. To re-
duce year-to-year ﬂuctuation in the data due to measurement error, the
simple average over 1994–96 (year-end stocks) is used.
The bilateral bank lendingdata are an average over three years of the out-
standing loans from thirteen lending countries to eighty-three borrowing
countries. After we exclude missing observations, there are altogether 793
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Table 10.3 List of Countries in the Sample
Countries
Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment
Source countries Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Host countries Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela
Bilateral International Bank Loans
Lending countries Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom,
United States
Borrowing countries Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo (Republic of the), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire,
Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji,
Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius,
Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal,
Slovakia, South Africa, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tonga,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwecountry pairs. The data come from the Bank for International Settlement’s
(BIS’s) Consolidated International Claims of BIS Reporting Banks on Indi-
vidual Countries and are given in millions of dollars. To reduce measure-
ment errors in a given year, we use the simple average over three years
(1994–96, year-end outstanding amounts).
Next we consider term structure of bank lending. The BIS data identify
loans with “maturity up to and including one year,” “maturity over one year
up to two years,” “maturity over two years,” and “unallocated maturity.”
These data are disaggregated by borrowing countries but not by the lender-
borrower pairs. Consequently, we construct a measure of the term structure
of borrowing at the borrowing country level as the ratio of all outstanding
bank loans with maturity up to and including one year to total loans. We
also construct an alternative of the importance of short-term borrowing as
the ratio of the short-term borrowing (loans up to and including one year)
to the sum of total loans and inward FDI.
The corruption level, by its very nature (secrecy and illegality), is diﬃcult
to measure. Three types of measures of corruption are available, and all are
perception-based subjective indexes. The ﬁrst is a rating given by consult-
ing ﬁrms’ in-house consultants or experts. Representative indexes are pro-
duced by the Business International (BI, now part of the Economist’s Eco-
nomic Intelligence Unit), and by Political Risk Services (which calls its
product an International Country Risk Group [ICRG] rating). The second
type is based on surveys of business executives (or other people in the coun-
try in question). The rating for a country is typically the average of the re-
spondents’ ratings. Examples of this include indexes in the Global Compet-
itiveness Report (GCR) and World Development Report (WDR), which will
be explained in more detail shortly. The third type is based on an average of
existing indexes. The best-known example is the index produced by Trans-
parency International (TI), a Germany-based nongovernmental organiza-
tion devoted to ﬁghting corruption. A drawback of this type of index is that
mixing indexes with diﬀerent country coverage and methodologies could
potentially introduce more noise to the measure.
Overall, corruption ratings based on surveys of ﬁrms are preferable to
those based on the intuition of in-house experts, for two main reasons.
First, the executives who respond to the GCR or WDR surveys presumably
have more direct experience with the corruption problem than do the con-
sultants who typically have to rate many countries each. Second, to the ex-
tent that each individual respondent has idiosyncratic errors in judgment,
the averaging process in the GCR or WDR indexes can minimize the inﬂu-
ence of such errors. In this paper, we use the indexes from the GCR and
WDR surveys as our basic measure of corruption.
The GCR index is derived from the Global Competitiveness Report 1997,
produced jointly by the Geneva-based World Economic Forum and Har-
vard Institute for International Development. The survey for the report was
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vey asked respondents (in question 8.03) to rate the level of corruption in
their country on a scale of 1 to 7, based on the extent of “irregular, addi-
tional payments connected with imports and exports permits, business li-
censes, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan appli-
cations.” The GCR corruption index is based on the country average of the
individual ratings.
The WDR index is derived from a World Bank survey in 1996 of 3,866
ﬁrms in seventy-three countries in preparation for its World Development
Report 1997.Question 14 of that survey asks: “Is it common for ﬁrms in my
line of business to have to pay some irregular, ‘additional’ payments to get
things done?” The respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption on
a scale of 1 to 6. The WDR corruption index is based on the country aver-
age of the individual answers. For both corruption indexes, the original
sources are such that a higher number implies lower corruption. To avoid
awkwardness in interpretation, they are rescaled in this paper so that a high
number now implies high corruption.
Since each index covers only a (diﬀerent) subset of countries for which we
have data on FDI or other forms of capital ﬂows, it may be desirable to form
a composite corruption index that combines the two indexes. The two in-
dexes are derived from surveys with similar methodologies and similar
questions. The correlation between the two is 0.83. We follow a simple
three-step procedure to construct the composite index: (a) use GCR as the
benchmark; (b) compute the average of the individual ratios of GCR to
WDR for all countries that are available in both GCR and the WDR; and
(c) for those countries that are covered by WDR but not GCR (which are
relatively rare), convert the WDRrating into the GCRscale by using the av-
erage ratio in (b).
For government policies toward FDI, we rely on detailed descriptions
compiled by the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in a series of country re-
ports entitled “Doing Business and Investing in China” (or in whatever
country may be the subject of the report). This series is written for multina-
tional ﬁrms intending to do business in a particular country and is collected
in one CD-ROM entitled “Doing Business and Investing Worldwide” (PwC
2000). For each potential host country, the relevant PwC country report
covers a variety of legal and regulatory issues of interest to foreign investors,
including “Restrictions on Foreign Investment and Investors” (typically
chap. 5), “Investment Incentives” (typically chap. 4), and “Taxation of For-
eign Corporations” (typically chap. 16).
With a desire to convert textual information into numerical codes, we
read through the relevant chapters for all countries that the PwC covers.
For “restrictions on FDI,” we create a variable taking a value from zero to
4, based on the presence or absence of restrictions in the following four ar-
eas:
472 Shang-Jin Wei and Yi Wu1. Existence of foreign exchange control (may interfere with foreign
ﬁrms’ ability to import intermediate inputs or repatriate proﬁts abroad)
2. Exclusion of foreign ﬁrms from certain strategic sectors (particularly
national defense and mass media)
3. Exclusion of foreign ﬁrms from additional sectors that would other-
wise be considered harmless in most developed countries
4. Restrictions on foreign ownership (e.g., prohibition of 100 percent
ownership)
Each of the four dimensions can be represented by a dummy that takes the
value 1 (in the presence of the speciﬁc restriction) or zero (in the absence of
the restriction). We create an overall FDI restriction variable that is equal to
the sum of these four dummies. FDI restriction is zero if there is no restric-
tion in any of the four categories and 4 if there is restriction in each category.
Similarly, we create an FDI incentives index based on information in the
following areas:
1. Existence of special incentives to invest in certain industries or geo-
graphic areas
2. Tax concessions speciﬁc to foreign ﬁrms (including tax holidays and
tax rebates, but excluding tax concessions speciﬁcally designed for export
promotion, which is in a separate category)
3. Cash grants, subsidized loans, reduced rent for land use, or other non-
tax concessions speciﬁc to foreign ﬁrms
4. Special promotion for exports (including the presence of export pro-
cessing zones, special economic zones, etc.)
An overall FDI incentives variable is created as the sum of the above four
dummies, so it can take a value of zero if there is no incentive in any of the
four categories and 4 if there are incentives in all of them.
Our coding of the incentives/restrictions measures is still coarse and may
not capture the true variations of the government policies. Nonetheless, it
is important to have a way to control for these types of government policies
in a statistical analysis of international capital ﬂows. Our contribution is to
create a ﬁrst-of-its-kind index. We let the data speak to the usefulness of
such an index.
Table 10.3 lists all the countries in our sample. Table 10.4 presents the
summary statistics for some key variables and the coeﬃcients of the pair-
wise correlation among the three measures of corruption and GDP per
capita.
10.3 Statistical Analyses
Studying the eﬀect of corruption on the composition of capital inﬂows is
equivalent to asking whether corruption may have a diﬀerential impact on
Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises 473diﬀerent forms of capital ﬂows. In this section, we proceed by sequentially
examining FDI, international bank lending, and the ratio between the two.
10.3.1 Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment
We ﬁrst examine the eﬀect of local corruption on the volume of inward
FDI. Our speciﬁcation can be motivated by a simple optimization problem
solved by a multinational ﬁrm. Let Kj be the stock of investment the multi-
national ﬁrm intends to allocate to host country j. Let tj be the rate of cor-
porate income tax in host country j, bj be the rate of bribery the ﬁrm must
pay per unit of output, and r be the rental rate of capital. Let f(Kj) be the
output of the ﬁrm in host country j. There are N possible host countries in
which the ﬁrm can invest. The ﬁrm chooses the level of Kj for j   1, 2, . . .




[(1   tj   bj)f(Kj)   rKj]
Note that as a simple way to indicate that tax and corruption are distor-
tionary, we let (1 – tj– bj) premultiply output rather than proﬁt. The optimal
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Table 10.4 Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Corruption
GCR/WDR combined 99 3.62 1.19 1.3 5.5
Transparency International 85 5.12 2.40 0 8.6
Tax rate (highest corporate 
income tax rate) 56 32.39 6.86 0 42
FDI incentives 49 1.65 0.69 0 3
FDI restrictions 49 1.69 1.18 0 4
Per capita GDP, 1994–96 154 5,792 9,222 104 43,602
ln(loan-FDI), bilateral 
1994–96 288 1.53 2.21 –8.06 8.75
ln(loan-FDI), balance of 
payments, 1994–96 125 0.31 2.00 –4.84 6.18
ln(portfolio-FDI), balance 
of payments, 1994–96 89 –0.66 1.98 –5.28 5.77
Correlation Matrix
Corruption
GDP Per Capita TI GCR WDR
GDP per capita 1
Corruption (TI) –0.82 1
Corruption (GCR)– 0.78 0.87 1
Corruption (WDR)– 0.72 0.86 0.83 1
Source: See appendix B.stock of FDI in country j, Kj, would of course be related to both the rate of
tax and that of corruption in the host country: K   K(tj, bj), where ∂K/∂t  
and ∂K/∂b   0.8
Let FDIkj be the bilateral stock of FDI from source country k to host




 iDi    1taxj    2corruptionj   Xj  Zkj  ekj,
where Di is a source country dummy that takes the value of 1 if the source
country is i (i.e., if k   i), and zero otherwise; Xj is a vector of characteris-
tics of host country j other than its tax and corruption levels; Zkjis a vector
of characteristics speciﬁc to the source-host country pairs; ekj is an inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error that follows a normal dis-
tribution; and  i,  1,  2,  , and   are parameters to be estimated.
This is a quasi–ﬁxed eﬀects regression in that source country dummies
are included. They are meant to capture all characteristics of the source
countries that may aﬀect the size of their outward FDI, including their size
and level of development. In addition, possible diﬀerences in the source
countries’ deﬁnition of FDI are controlled for by these ﬁxed eﬀects under
the assumption that the FDI values for a particular country pair under
these deﬁnitions are proportional to each other except for an additive error
that is not correlated with other regressors in the regression. We do not im-
pose host country ﬁxed eﬀects, as doing so would eliminate the possibility
of estimating all the interesting parameters, including the eﬀect of corrup-
tion.
Using the combined GCR/WDRrating as the measure of corruption, the
regression is run and reported in column (1) of table 10.5. Most variables
have the expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. A rise in host coun-
try tax rate is associated with less inward FDI. Government incentives and
the restrictions on FDI have a positive and a negative coeﬃcient, respec-
tively, consistent with our intuition. Most importantly, corruption has a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on FDI. Note that in the regres-
sions, we have standardized the corruption measure (by subtracting the
mean and dividing it by the sample standard deviation) so that the point es-
timate can be interpreted as the response of the left-hand side variable with
respect to a 1–standard deviation increase in corruption. Therefore, using
the GCR/WDR measure of corruption (columns [1]–[2] of table 10.5), a 1–
standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 40 percent
decline in FDI. In other words, the negative eﬀect of corruption is not just
Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises 475
8. More sophisticated generalization includes endogenizing the level of corruption (and tax)
such as in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) or Kaufmann and Wei (1999). These generalizations are
outside the scope of the current paper.statistically signiﬁcant, but also quantitatively large. This ﬁnding is quali-
tatively in line with Wei (2000a), which employed a diﬀerent econometric
speciﬁcation.
We perform several robustness checks. First, we add host country ran-
dom eﬀects to the speciﬁcation. The regression result is reported in column
(2) of table 10.5. The point estimate on corruption declines slightly, but re-
mains negative and signiﬁcant. We also adopt an alternative measure of
corruption from the TI and repeated the regressions (columns [3]–[4]). The
qualitative results are unchanged. The estimated elasticity of FDI with re-
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Table 10.5 Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment
GCR/WDR Transparency International
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Measure of Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption –0.427** –0.407** –0.502** –0.508**
(0.103) (0.168) (0.111) (0.183)
Tax rate –0.031** –0.034* –0.030** –0.034*
(0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019)
FDI incentives 0.403** 0.324** 0.400** 0.345**
(0.095) (0.162) (0.095) (0.157)
FDI restrictions –0.335** –0.323** –0.324** –0.308**
(0.058) (0.098) (0.058) (0.096)
Log(GDP) 0.857** 0.942** 0.909** 0.994**
(0.053) (0.091) (0.055) (0.091)
Log(per capita GDP) –0.039 –0.121 –0.125 –0.218
(0.086) (0.143) (0.096) (0.158)
Log distance –0.555** –0.856** –0.557** –0.844**
(0.060) (0.067) (0.060) (0.067)
Linguistic tie 1.426** 1.041** 1.409** 1.049**
(0.211) (0.194) (0.210) (0.195)
Exchange rate volatility 0.053 –2.752 0.210 –2.354
(1.968) (3.033) (1.960) (2.954)
Adjusted R2/overall R2 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
N 628 628 628 628
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Fixed effects regression: log FDIkj = source country dummies
+ bXkj + ekj, where FDIkj is FDI from source country k to host country j. All regressions include source
country dummies whose coefﬁcients are not reported to save space. Random-effects speciﬁcation: Ykj =
source country dummies + bXkj + uj + ekj, where uj is the host-country random effect. Log(FDI),
log(GDP), and log(per capita GDP) are averaged over 1994–96. Exchange rate volatility = standard de-
viation of the ﬁrst difference in log monthly exchange rate (per US$) from January 1994 through De-
cember 1996. The corruption measure is standardized (i.e., corruption in the regressions = [original cor-
ruption – sample mean]/[sample standard deviation]). Hence, the coefﬁcient on corruption can be read
as the response of the left-hand-side variable with respect to a 1 standard deviation increase in corrup-
tion.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.spect to corruption is somewhat larger: a 1–standard deviation increase in
corruption in the host country is associated with a 50 percent drop in in-
ward FDI.
10.3.2 Corruption and Composition of Capital Inﬂows
We now move to the central empirical question in the paper: does cor-
ruption aﬀect the composition of capital inflows? This is equivalent to
asking whether corruption aﬀects FDI and international bank loans dif-
ferently. We start by examining the relationship between corruption and
bilateral bank loans, in a manner analogous to our previous studies of bi-
lateral FDI (except that government policies toward FDI and tax rate on
foreign-invested ﬁrms are omitted).9
Table 10.6 reports four regressions, with diﬀerent specifications (only
source country fixed eﬀects, or additional host country random eﬀects), or
with diﬀerence sources of corruption measures (GCR/WDR and TI). The
results are basically consistent (and somewhat surprising). When corrup-
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9. We have not found a consistent data source on government policies toward international
bank borrowing across countries, nor are we able to construct such a series from the PwC
country reports.
Table 10.6 Corruption and Bank Lending
GCR/WDR Transparency International
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Measure of Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption 0.376** 0.390** 0.197† 0.135
(0.092) (0.120) (0.127) (0.166)
East of investing in securities  0.219** 0.262** 0.110 0.161
and bonds market (0.088) (0.115) (0.089) (0.116)
Log(GDP) 1.004** 1.054** 0.984** 1.052**
(0.054) (0.068) (0.060) (0.076)
Log(per capita GDP) 0.366** 0.356** 0.388** 0.337**
(0.063) (0.081) (0.096) (0.125)
Log distance –0.244** –0.428** –0.224** –0.432**
(0.072) (0.082) (0.076) (0.085)
Linguistic tie 0.633** 0.818** 0.556** 0.776**
(0.207) (0.198) (0.210) (0.200)
Exchange rate volatility –5.917** –7.253** –5.359** –6.598**
(1.564) (1.966) (1.618) (2.060)
Adjusted R2/overall R2 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.72
N 396 396 396 396
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: See notes to table 10.5
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.tion is measured by the GCR/WDRindex, it has a positive and statistically
significant coeﬃcient. In other words, in contrast with the previous results
on FDI, corruption in borrowing countries seems to be associated with a
higher level of borrowing from international banks. In appendix D, we
also restrict the sample to a single lending country (such as France, Japan,
or the United States). Generally speaking, the coeﬃcient on corruption in
the loan regression continues to be positive (although not always signifi-
cant).
The earlier part of the paper suggests two stories in which international
direct investors are more discouraged by local corruption than interna-
tional banks. The ﬁrst is that greater sunk costs or greater ex post vulnera-
bility of the direct investment would make direct investors more cautious ex
ante than international banks in doing business in a corrupt host country.
The second is the greater probability of an implicit or explicit bailout pro-
vided by the current international ﬁnancial system to international loans
than international direct investment. These stories explain only a composi-
tional shift away from FDI toward bank loans in corrupt recipient coun-
tries. Are they also consistent with an absolute increase in the borrowing
from international banks by corrupt countries? One possibility is that FDI
and international bank loans are imperfect substitutes. In a corrupt recipi-
ent country, precisely because of the lost FDI due to corruption, there are
relatively more activities that must be ﬁnanced by borrowing from interna-
tional banks.10
In columns (3) and (4) of table 10.6, an alternative measure of corruption
by the TI index is used. This time, corruption still has a positive coeﬃcient,
although the estimate is not statistically diﬀerent from zero when host
country random eﬀects are added.
When we combine the results on FDI and bank loans, it would seem nat-
ural to expect that corruption would raise the ratio of bank loans to FDI.
To verify that this is indeed the case, we also check directly the connection
between the ratio of bank loans to FDI and host country corruption. We












        corruptionj   Xkj    ekj
  is a scalar parameter and   is a vector of parameters with an appropri-
ate dimension. The regression results are reported in columns (1–4) in table
10.7. As expected, the coeﬃcient on corruption is positive and statistically
source country
ﬁxed eﬀects
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10. Following a suggestion from Martin Feldstein, we have added other determinants of
FDI, speciﬁcally tax, government restrictions on inward FDI, and government incentives for
FDI into the loan regression. Our objective is to determine whether other factors that dis-
courage (or encourage) FDI would show up as encouraging (or discouraging) international
bank loans. Unfortunately, these variables are statistically not diﬀerent from zero. An example
of this is reported as column (2) of appendix D.signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Using the point estimate in the ﬁrst re-
gression, we see that a 1–standard deviation increase in corruption is asso-
ciated with roughly a 66 percent increase in the loan-FDI ratio (e.g.,
roughly from 100 to 166 percent).
Based on the ﬁrst regression in table 10.7, ﬁgure 10.3 presents a partial
scatter plot of loan-FDI ratio against corruption, controlling for several
characteristics of the host countries as described in the regression. A visual
inspection of the plot suggests that positive association between corruption
and capital composition is unlikely to go away if we omit any one or two ob-
servations. Hence, the evidence suggests that a corrupt country tends to
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Table 10.7 Composition of Capital Flows
GCR/WDR
IV, IV,
Fixe dR andom Fixed Random Fixed Fixed
Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects
Measure of Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 0.662** 0.680** 0.707** 0.720** 0.296† 0.285†
(0.128) (0.225) (0.176) (0.290) (0.181) (0.182)
Tax rate 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020
(0.017) (0.031) (0.018) (0.029)
FDI incentives 0.194 0.244 –0.056 –0.019 0.111 0.095
(0.152) (0.260) (0.160) (0.254) (0.156) (0.157)
FDI restrictions 0.440** 0.446** 0.458** 0.446** 0.336** 0.333**
(0.086) (0.157) (0.088) (0.145) (0.093) (0.093)
Log(GDP) –0.569** –0.651** –0.597** –0.655** –0.274** –0.254**
(0.107) (0.186) (0.110) (0.174) (0.115) (0.118)
Log(per capita GDP) 0.172* 0.205 0.272** 0.302 0.034 0.033
(0.098) (0.181) (0.125) (0.210) (0.103) (0.103)
Log distance 0.350** 0.543** 0.357** 0.525** 0.123 0.111
(0.094) (0.114) (0.096) (0.114) (0.132) (0.132)
Linguistic tie –0.699** –0.680** –0.722** –0.700** –0.753** –0.803**
(0.305) (0.287) (0.313) (0.292) (0.289) (0.296)
Exchange rate volatility –0.661 –0.007 –1.351 –0.755 –1.793
(2.060) (3.505) (2.216) (3.488) (2.226)
Overidentifying restriction 
(p-value of the test) 0.43 0.40
Adjusted R2/overall R2 0.49 0.52 0.46 0.50 aa
N 225 225 225 225 180 180
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable: log(loan) – log(FDI), averaged over 1994–96. IV = instrumental variables.
See also notes to table 10.5.
aR2 for IV regressions are not reported, as they do not have the standard interpretation.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.
GCR/WDR
Transparency
Internationalhave a composition of capital inﬂows that is relatively light in FDI and rel-
atively heavy in bank loans.
Also note that because FDI is more relationship-intensive (as proxied by
physical and linguistic distances) than bank loans, the coeﬃcients on geo-
graphic distance and the linguistic tie dummy are positive and negative, re-
spectively.
One might be concerned with possible endogeneity of the corruption
measure. For example, survey respondents may perceive a country to be
corrupt in part because they observe very little FDI going there. In this case,
the positive association between the loan-FDI ratio and corruption can be
due to a reverse causality.
We perform instrumental variable (IV) regressions on our key regres-
sions. Mauro (1995) argued that ethnolinguistic fragmentation is a good
IV for corruption. His ethnolinguistic indicator measures the probability
that two persons from a country are from two distinct ethnic groups. The
greater the indicator, the more fragmented the country. In addition, La
Porta et al. (1998) argued that legal origin or colonial history has an im-
portant impact on the quality of government bureaucracy. These variables
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Fig. 10.3 Composition of capital inﬂows and corruption (partial correlation based on
table 10.7, column [1])
Source: Authors’ calculations.are used as instruments for the corruption measure. A ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion suggests that ethnically more fragmented countries are more corrupt.
In addition, it suggests that countries with a French legal origin (includ-
ing colonies of Spain and Portugal) are more corrupt than former British
colonies.
The IV regressions are reported in the last two columns of table 10.7. A
test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The results from these
two IV regressions are still consistent with the notion that corruption deters
FDI more than bank loans. Therefore, countries that are more corrupt tend
to have a capital inﬂow structure that relies relatively more on bank bor-
rowing than FDI.
Our sample is potentially censored. A source country may choose not to
invest at all in a particular host country precisely because of the corruption
level and other characteristics of that country. In that case, either FDI or
bank lending or both may be zero. The regression procedure used so far
would drop these observations. However, our left-hand side variable, the ra-
tio of bank loans to FDI, does not lend itself naturally to a Tobit speciﬁca-
tion. For this reason, the following transformation of the ratio is con-
structed as the left-hand side variable: log(bank lending 0.1) – log(FDI  
0.1). The results are presented in table 10.8. With this new variable, there is
a small increase in the number of observations (from 225 to 231). The most
important message from table 10.8 is that the earlier conclusion remains
true: Corruption tilts the composition of capital inﬂows away from FDI
and toward international bank loans.
10.3.3 Portfolio and Direct Investments from the United States
Although bilateral data on portfolio investment other than bank credits
are not available for the whole set of capital-exporting countries examined
in the previous sections, we can obtain data on portfolio investment origi-
nating from the United States (to a set of developing countries). In this sec-
tion, the data on U.S. outward capital ﬂows are used to examine whether the
ratio of portfolio to direct investment in a capital-receiving country is
aﬀected by its corruption level. We must caution at the outset that the num-
ber of observations is small (between 35 to 39, depending on the regression
speciﬁcation). Thus, the power of the statistical tests is likely to be low.
Six ﬁxed eﬀects regressions are performed and reported in table 10.9. In
the ﬁrst three columns, we use the GCR/WDR indicator of corruption. We
see again that, at least for this subsample, the ratio of portfolio investment
to FDI is also positively related to the capital-importing country’s corrup-
tion level. The more corrupt a country, the less FDI it receives (relative to
portfolio capital). However, when we use the TI corruption index (in the last
three columns), the coeﬃcients on corruption are no longer statistically
Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises 481signiﬁcant, although they are always positive. The insigniﬁcance can be con-
sistent with a genuinely zero coeﬃcient or can result from a low power of
the test due to the small sample size.
10.3.4 Evidence from the Balance-of-Payments Data
If we are willing to forgo bilateral data and employ data from the balance-
of-payments (BOP) statistics, we may be able to include more capital-
importing countries in our analysis.11 In particular, we continue to use the
ratio of portfolio inﬂow to FDI, or the loan–FDI ratio, as the dependent
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Table 10.8 Transformed Ratio of Loans to Foreign Direct Investment
GCR/WDR
IV, IV,
FixedR andom Fixed Random Fixed Fixed
Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects
Measure of Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 0.675** 0.674** 0.701** 0.681** 0.382* 0.374*
(0.151) (0.226) (0.210) (0.320) (0.199) (0.196)
Tax rate 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.020) (0.031) (0.021) (0.032)
FDI incentives 0.040 0.072 –0.196 –0.166 –0.014 –0.023
(0.178) (0.262) (0.187) (0.280) (0.171) (0.169)
FDI restrictions 0.546** 0.550** 0.558** 0.547** 0.427** 0.425**
(0.101) (0.156) (0.103) (0.159) (0.103) (0.102)
Log(GDP) –0.591** –0.645** –0.615** –0.657** –0.323** –0.309**
(0.128) (0.189) (0.131) (0.194) (0.128) (0.129)
Log(per capita GDP) 0.227** 0.239 0.314*** 0.318 0.114 0.113
(0.117) (0.182) (0.149) (0.232) (0.114) (0.112)
Log distance 0.391** 0.477** 0.396** 0.479** 0.159 0.151
(0.112) (0.133) (0.115) (0.135) (0.147) (0.146)
Linguistic tie –0.490 –0.504 –0.513 –0.522† –0.752** –0.787**
(0.365) (0.356) (0.373) (0.360) (0.325) (0.326)
Exchange rate volatility 0.563 1.091 –0.279 0.442 –1.257
(2.368) (3.490) (2.553) (3.798) (2.451)
Overidentifying restriction 
(p-value of the test) 0.28 0.28
Adjusted R2/overall R2 0.48 0.51 0.45 0.50 —— ——
N 231 231 231 231 183 183
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable: log(loan + 0.1) – log(FDI + 0.1), averaged over 1994–96. IV = instrumental
variables. See also notes to table 10.5.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.




11. Note, however, that the number of observations with the BOP data may not be greater
than that with the bilateral loan-FDI data.variable. To minimize the eﬀect of year-to-year ﬂuctuation, we again aver-
age the ratios over a three-year period (1994–96).
The results are reported in the upper half of table 10.10. In column (1),
where the dependent variable is the ratio of portfolio and FDI, we can see that
corruption (as measured by a hybrid of GCR and WDR) is positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant: More corrupt countries on average attract more portfo-
lio inﬂows than FDI. In column (2), we examine the loan-FDI ratio as the de-
pendent variable. The corruption variable is not signiﬁcant. However, we
observe that many other regressors are not signiﬁcant either. If we drop two
of the insigniﬁcant regressors (FDI incentives and restrictions), then the
coeﬃcient on corruption becomes positive and signiﬁcant. If we further drop
two additional insigniﬁcant variables (tax rate and exchange rate volatility),
corruption remains positive and signiﬁcant. Thus, even with the BOP data,
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Table 10.9 U.S.-bilateral Portfolio Data
GCR/WDR Transparency International
Measure of Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 0.321* 0.319* 0.341† 0.283 0.324 0.307
(0.173) (0.171) (0.208) (0.247) (0.270) (0.275)
Tax rate –0.023 –0.033
(0.036) (0.033)
FDI incentives –0.218 –0.215
(0.255) (0.249)
FDI restrictions 0.214 0.167
(0.156) (0.165)
Ease of investing in securities  0.364* 0.280
and bonds market (0.203) (0.199)
Log(GDP) 0.304** 0.311** 0.371** 0.289** 0.287** 0.344**
(0.138) (0.152) (0.161) (0.124) (0.137) (0.155)
Log(per capita GDP) 0.506** 0.517** 0.441** 0.512** 0.557** 0.461**
(0.100) (0.100) (0.152) (0.163) (0.177) (0.202)
Log distance –0.200* –0.187† –0.194† –0.198** –0.180† –0.203†
(0.101) (0.113) (0.129) (0.085) (0.107) (0.127)
Linguistic tie 0.870** 0.814** 1.004** 0.853** 0.797** 0.984**
(0.238) (0.251) (0.287) (0.269) (0.278) (0.294)
Exchange rate volatility 3.515** 3.990† 2.436 3.281
(1.649) (2.367) (2.254) (2.739)
Government deﬁcit 0.009 0.023 0.006 0.005
(0.034) (0.047) (0.039) (0.049)
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.51 0.54 0.58
N 39 36 35 39 36 35
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable: log(portfolio investment) – log(FDI), averaged over 1994–96. The portfolio
and FDI values are the sum of the ﬂows over 1994–96. Also see the notes to table 10.5.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.there is evidence that corrupt countries would have greater diﬃculties in at-
tracting FDI relative to bank loans. In columns (5)–(6) of table 10.10, we use
a diﬀerent measure of corruption (TI index). The results remain the same:
Corruption discourages FDI more than bank loans or portfolio inﬂows.
We repeat the exercise with the left-hand side variables over a diﬀerent
time period (1997–98), which is the period that Hausmann and Fernandez-
Arias (2000) examined. The regression results are reported in the lower half
of table 10.11. Contrary to their inference, we ﬁnd exactly the same pattern
as in our previous tables: corrupt countries on average have relatively more
diﬃculties in attracting FDI than the other forms of capital inﬂows.
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Measure of Flow-FDI Loan-FDI Loan-FDI Loan-FDI Flow-FDI Loan-FDI
Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption 1.296** 0.356 0.702** 0.669** 1.046** 0.832*
(0.319) (0.417) (0.347) (0.269) (0.382) (0.428)
Tax rate 0.069 0.010 0.041 0.045 0.001
(0.050) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
FDI incentives –0.260 –0.562 –0.263 –0.572
(0.484) (0.582) (0.442) (0.506)
FDI restrictions 0.197 0.281 0.023 0.245
(0.280) (0.249) (0.326) (0.252)
Ease of portfolio  0.288 –0.056
investment (0.471) (0.554)
Log (GDP) 0.559** 0.414 0.022 –0.256† 0.548** 0.332
(0.252) (0.349) (0.293) (0.165) (0.239) (0.313)
Log (per capita 0.861** 0.314 0.560* 0.316† 0.851** 0.641*
GDP) (0.304) (0.360) (0.283) (0.198) (0.390) (0.367)
Exchange rate  –7.148† –10.322 –6.070 –5.067 –11.410
volatility (4.406) (12.181) (11.489) (5.838) (11.525)
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.46 0.31
N 41 39 44 73 41 39
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The left-hand-side variables are in logarithm form and are av-
eraged over 1994–96. Exchange rate volatility = standard deviation of the ﬁrst difference in log monthly
exchange rate (per US$) from January 1994 through December 1996. The corruption variable is stan-
dardized (i.e., corruption in the regressions = [original corruption – sample mean]/[sample standard de-
viation]). Hence, the coefﬁcient on corruption can be read as the response of the left-hand-side variable
with respect to a one standard deviation increase in corruption.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.10.3.5 Maturity Structure of the Foreign Borrowing
A diﬀerent dimension of the capital ﬂow composition, namely, the rela-
tive share of the short-term borrowing, has been stressed in the literature as
also being related to the likelihood of a currency crisis (see Rodrik and Ve-
lasco 1999).
We look into the possible connection between this measure of composi-
tion of capital inﬂows and corruption. The results are reported in table
10.12. It turns out that there is no robust evidence for a systematic relation-
ship between the two. Thus, contrary to the share of FDI in total capital
ﬂows, higher corruption per se may not be associated with a greater reliance
on short-term borrowing.
10.3.6 Currency Structure of Foreign Borrowing
Countries that experience a BOP crisis are often criticized for having ei-
ther too much short-term borrowing or too much borrowing in a hard cur-
rency. Of course, both the tendency to borrow in the short term and the ten-
dency to borrow in a hard currency are linked to a country’s inability to
borrow internationally in its own currency.
Using the ratio of international bonds issued in a country’s currency to all
international bonds issued by that country as a measure of a country’s abil-
ity to borrow in its own currency, we can examine possible connections
between a country’s extent of corruption and this ability to borrow in its
own currency. The results are reported in table 10.13. When we use the
486 Shang-Jin Wei and Yi Wu
Table 10.12 Maturity of Debt
(Short-term bank loan)/
(total loan + FDI)
(Short-term bank loan)/
(total loan)
GCR/WDR TI GCR/WDR TI
Corruption 0.040 0.155† –0.108 0.027
(0.082) (0.102) (0.083) (0.089)
Log(GDP) 0.097* 0.067 –0.013 –0.009
(0.049) (0.048) (0.036) (0.032)
Log(per capita GDP) 0.032 0.101 –0.032 0.007
(0.063) (0.080) (0.058) (0.060)
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.003
N 32 33 77 64
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Short-term loans are loans with maturity of less
than and up to one year. Bank loans for a particular recipient country are its borrowing from
all BIS-reporting countries (mostly OECD countries). To maximize comparability, the value
of FDI for a host country is the sum of inward FDI from OECD countries (rather than total
inward FDI from the balance-of-payments source).
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.GCR/WDR measure of corruption, there is a negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant association between corruption and the ability to borrow in the
country’s own currency. This negative association remains when we add in-
come level as a control. On the other hand, when we use an alternative mea-
sure of corruption (the TI index) and when income level is controlled for, the
coeﬃcient on corruption is no longer signiﬁcant (although still negative). We
have also tried a tobit speciﬁcation in which zero percent issuance of inter-
national debt in a country’s own currency is assumed to be censored from be-
low. The coeﬃcient on corruption is negative if there is no per capita income
in the regression but insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero if there is per capita
income. Overall, there is some (weak) support for the notion that higher cor-
ruption is associated with a lower ability to borrow internationally in one’s
own currency. This may be considered corroborative evidence that corrup-
tion may have raised a country’s likelihood to slide into a currency crisis.
10.4 Conclusion
Corruption aﬀects the composition of capital inﬂows in a way that is un-
favorable to the country. A corrupt country receives substantially less FDI;
however, it may not be disadvantaged as much in obtaining bank loans. As
a result, corruption in a capital-importing country tends to tilt the compo-
sition of its capital inﬂows away from FDI and toward foreign bank loans.
The data support this hypothesis. This result is robust across diﬀerent mea-
sures of corruption and diﬀerent econometric speciﬁcations.
There are two possible reasons for this eﬀect. First, FDI is more likely to
be exploited by local corrupt oﬃcials ex post than foreign loans. As a result,
less FDI would go to corrupt countries ex ante. Second, the current inter-
national ﬁnancial architecture is such that there is more insurance or pro-
tection from the IMF and the G7 governments for bank lenders from de-
veloped countries than for direct investors.
Previous research (starting with Frankel and Rose 1996) has shown that
a capital inﬂow structure that is relatively low in FDI is associated with a
greater propensity for a future currency crisis. It may be that international
bank loans (or other portfolio ﬂows) swing more than direct investment in
the event of bad news (whether genuine or self-generated by international
investors) about economic or policy fundamentals. If so, this paper has pro-
vided evidence for one possible channel through which corruption in a de-
veloping country may increase its chances of running into a future crisis.
In the literature on the causes of currency crises, crony capitalism and
self-fulﬁlling expectations by international creditors are often proposed as
two rival hypotheses. Indeed, authors who subscribe to one view often do
not accept the other. The evidence in this paper suggests a natural linkage
between the two. Crony capitalism, through its eﬀect on the composition of
a country’s capital inﬂows, makes it more vulnerable to the self-fulﬁlling-
expectations type of currency crisis.
488 Shang-Jin Wei and Yi WuCorruption could also lead to a ﬁnancial crisis by weakening domestic ﬁ-
nancial supervision and damaging the quality of banks’ and ﬁrms’ balance
sheets. This possibility itself can be a topic for a useful research project.
Appendix A
Justiﬁcation for the Econometric Speciﬁcation That Links 
the Composition of Capital Inﬂows and Corruption
In the main empirical part of the paper, we have performed several regres-
sions that examine the connection between corruption and the ratio of FDI
and non-FDI capital ﬂows. In this section, a simple model is used to
demonstrate how such a reduced-form speciﬁcation can be justiﬁed. For
simplicity, let us consider that there are two types of international capital
ﬂows: direct investment and bank credit.
Let us suppose that the government in the capital-importing country k
maximizes the two-period objective function
U(Gk1)    U(Gk2),
where Gk1 and Gk2 are expenditures by the government in country k in pe-
riod 1 and period 2, respectively, and  is the subjective discount factor. For
simplicity, we assume that the tax revenues in the two periods, T k1 and T k2,
are exogenously given. Let Bk and Dk are ﬁrst-period borrowing by country
k from international banks and ﬁrst-period direct investment in country k,
respectively. To abstract from unnecessary complications, we assume that
bank credit and FDI are merely two forms of additional funding sources.
No production is explicitly modeled. In this case, the gap between the ﬁrst-
period expenditure and tax revenue must be met by the inﬂow of interna-
tional capital:
Gk1   T k1   Bk   Dk
In the second period, the international credit must be repaid. Moreover,
international direct investors are assumed to recoup both the investment
and the gross proﬁt.
Gk2   T k2   R(Bk)Bk   R(Dk)Dk,
where R(Bk) and R(Dk) are the gross returns that international creditors and
international director investors would demand from country k. Suppose R∗
is the gross return on the risk-free bond (say, the U.S. government bond as
an approximation), then, we assume that
R(Bk)   R∗    Bk
and
Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises 489R(Dk)   R∗    Dk    kDk.
Both  and  kare positive. Think of  kas proportional to country k’s per-
ceived level of corruption. The positive   reﬂects the assumption that the
warranted returns on either bank credit or direct investment increase with
the size of the capital inﬂow. Note that  kappears in the return on the direct
investment but not in that on bank credit because corruption represents a
greater risk to direct investment than to bank loans (for the two reasons de-
scribed in the previous section; relative to bank lending, FDI faces greater
sunk costs and less protection from the international ﬁnancial system).
A few points are worth noting here. First, we assume that the bank credit
is obtained and later paid back by the government. In reality, either the
private or the public sector can borrow from the international credit mar-
ket. Many researchers have observed that the distinction between private
and public borrowing is very thin because private borrowing from the in-
ternational credit market often carries an implicit, and sometimes an ex-
plicit, guarantee from the government of the borrowing country. Second,
while direct investment is supposed to be for the long term, investors even-
tually would want to recoup both the initial investment and the cumulative
proﬁts along the way.
The government’s maximization problem yields the following two ﬁrst-
order conditions:
U (Gk1)    U (Gk2)(R∗   2 Bk)   0
and
U (Gk1)    U (Gk2)(R∗   2 Bk   2 kDk)   0
This implies a particular relationship between the composition of capital





    
  
 
 k  .
Hence, the higher the corruption level in country k, the less FDI it would
receive relative to its bank borrowing. The ratio of non-FDI forms of capi-
tal ﬂow to FDI can be linked to the recipient country’s level of corruption.
Appendix B
Source and Construction of the Variables
Bilateral Bank Loans
Source: BIS website [http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm]. Data are at the
end of December in US$ millions. Loans to oﬀshore banking centers are
omitted.
490 Shang-Jin Wei and Yi WuBilateral Foreign Direct Investment
Source: OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1998
diskettes. Unit: US$ millions (converted into US$ using the yearly average
exchange rates from annex III of the book).
Total Inward FDI, Portfolio, and Other Investment
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics CD-ROM, lines 78bed,
78bgd, and 78bid, respectively.
Distance
Source for latitude and longitude: Rudloﬀ (1981), updated from Pearce
and Smith (1984). Greater circle distance (in kilometers) between economic
centers (usually capital cities) in a pair of countries based on the latitude
and longitude data.
Argentina. Used the average latitude and longitude of Buenos Aires, Cor-
doba, and Rosario.
Australia. Used the average latitude and longitude of Canberra, Sydney,
and Melbourne.
Bahrain. Used the latitude and longitude data from the city of Muharraq.
Bermuda. Used the latitude and longitude data from Kindley Air Force
Base.
Bhutan. Used the latitude and longitude data from [http://www.kingdom
ofbhutan.com/kingdom.html].
Canada. Used the average latitude and longitude of Toronto, Vancouver,
and Montreal.
Equatorial Guinea. Used the latitude and longitude data from the city of
Santa Isabel.
Greenland. Used the latitude and longitude data from the city of Peary
Land.
India. Used the average latitude and longitude of New Delhi, Bombay, and
Calcutta.
Israel. Used the latitude and longitude data from Lod Airport (near Java
and Tel Aviv).
Mauritius.Used the latitude and longitude data from the city of Diego Gra-
cia.
The Netherlands. Used the latitude and longitude data from the city of De
Bilt.
Slovak. Used the latitude and longitude data from the city of Poprad.
Sudan. Used the average latitude and longitude of Atbara Khartoum and
El Fasher.
Switzerland. Used the latitude and longitude data from the city of Zu-
rich.
Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises 491Brazil. Used the average latitude and longitude of Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro,
and Sao Paulo.
Panama. Used the latitude and longitude data from Panama City.
Russia. Used the average latitude and longitude of Moscow, St. Petersburg,
and Nizhni.
Nizhny Novogorod. Used the data from [http://www.unn.runnet.ru/nn/
whereis.htm].
Kazakhstan.Used the average latitude and longitude of Almaty, Chimkent,
and Karaganda.
United States.Used the latitude and longitude data from Kansas City, Mis-
souri.
Linguistic Tie
Source of major languages: CIA (1999).




Source: World Economic Forum (1997).
Transformation: Values in this paper   8 – original values.
WDR Index
Original source: World Bank (1997). Data are from Kaufmann and Wei
(1999).
Transformation: Values in this paper   8 – original values.
TI Index
Source: Transparency International 1998 index [http://www.gwdg.de/
~uwvw/icr.htm].
Transformation: Values in this paper  10 – original values. Thus, a larger
number means more corruption.
Gross Domestic Product and GDP per Capita
Source: World Bank, SIMA/GDFand WDRcentral database. GDP data
are GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$); GDP per capita data are
calculated using GDP divided by population.
Monthly Exchange Rate (end of period)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, via the World Bank
SIMA database.
492 Shang-Jin Wei and Yi WuGovernment Deﬁcit to GDP Ratio
Source: World Bank, SIMA/GDF and WDI central database.
U.S. Bilateral Data
Source. U.S. Department of the Treasury website [http://www.ustreas.
gov/tic/ticsec.htm]. Sum of the U.S. portfolio investments in other countries
(gross sale by foreigners to U.S. residents, foreign bonds and foreign stocks),
1994–96. All amounts in US$ millions.
Legal Origins
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Accounting Standard
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Corporate Tax Rates
Source: PwC (2000), updated from World Economic Forum (1997).
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Comment Martin Feldstein
This is a very good paper. It is innovative and convincing. It deals with a sig-
niﬁcant problem and brings new data to bear on this issue. Its starting point
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Martin Feldstein is the George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University and
the president of the National Bureau of Economic Research.is the general agreement that an excessive dependence on foreign loans in-
creases the risk of currency crises because foreign banks can decide not to
renew maturing loans when they suspect potential repayment problems. In
contrast, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a much less volatile source of ex-
ternal ﬁnancing. The mix of external ﬁnancing and, in particular, the extent
of dependence on foreign loans is therefore important to a country that is
looking for strategies to reduce its vulnerability.
The central point of the paper by Wei and Wu is that domestic corrup-
tion can increase the risk of a currency crisis by shifting the availability of
foreign funds from direct investment to bank loans. If corruption does re-
duce the inﬂow of FDI and if the unexploited investment opportunities that
result from reduced FDI are ﬁnanced instead by foreign loans, it follows
that corruption indirectly increases the risk of crisis.
The Wei-Wu paper therefore focuses on whether corruption (as mea-
sured by the survey data that the authors describe) reduces FDI. The results
of the regression analysis are very clear in showing that corruption does
appear to reduce the inflow of FDI. An obvious question is whether the
corruption variable is really capturing the eﬀect of corruption per se or is
simply a proxy for something else that is responsible for depressing FDI.
For example, are countries that are more corrupt than average and that
practice more than the usual amount of cronyism also countries that want
to keep out foreign investment in order to save the investment opportunities
for local investors?
To deal with this potential problem, Wei and Wu construct two clever in-
dexes: One measures the attraction that the country’s current policy pro-
vides to FDI, and the other measures the extent to which the country’s poli-
cies discourage FDI. When the authors add these two variables to their
regression, the coeﬃcients imply that the measures of things that would at-
tract FDI are positively associated with higher levels of FDI, and the vari-
able measuring things that would repel FDI is negatively associated with
FDI. Both of these variables are statistically signiﬁcant. Most important,
adding them to the regression does not change the basic result that the cor-
ruption variable discourages FDI.
There may of course be other variables that are omitted and that are cor-
related with corruption. One candidate for that would be the legal system
itself. The work that Andrei Shleifer (and his co-authors LaPorta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Vishney) and others have done suggests that foreign in-
vestors (especially those from the United States and Britain) would be at-
tracted to countries that had Anglo-Saxon–type legal systems that provide
greater protection for investors. Those legal safeguards might tilt the bal-
ance in favor of more FDI in such countries.
Wei and Wu do not include a measure of the legal system among the re-
gressions but note that they use such a variable as an instrument for the cor-
ruption variable when doing instrumental variable estimation. They also re-
502 Shang-Jin Wei and Yi Wuport that they performed an explicit test of whether the variable ought to be
in the equation in its own right and concluded (rather surprisingly to me)
that although the legal system variable is a good instrument, it does not be-
long in the equation as an explicit variable in its own right. I would be a little
more comfortable if the authors performed a sensitivity analysis by includ-
ing it in the regression and gave us an ordinary least squares regression es-
timate of the equation with corruption and legal variables both included.
However, demonstrating that corruption reduces FDI is not the same as
demonstrating that corruption leads to an increased dependence on loans,
and it is the dependence on loans that is the key link to the risk of interna-
tional crises. Wei and Wu do show that corruption leads to an increase in
the ratio of loans to FDI. However, the risk comes from the volume of for-
eign loans and not from the ratio of loans to FDI. The eﬀect of corruption
on the ratio of loans to FDI may simply be driven by its eﬀect on the de-
nominator.
What matters for the risk of crises is not the ratio of foreign loans to FDI
but the level of foreign loans relative to gross domestic product (GDP) or
export earnings. The ratio of foreign loans to FDI could be high with very
little foreign loan exposure relative to GDP or to exports if FDI is very low.
Fortunately, the paper does give us direct evidence on the eﬀect of corrup-
tion on the ratio of loans to GDP (in table 10.6.) The positive eﬀect of the
corruption variable on the volume of foreign loans supports the idea that
corruption increases foreign loans.
What remains to establish is that the positive eﬀect of corruption on loans
is the result of a shift from the discouraged FDI to the use of loans to ﬁ-
nance the same investment. That is, the key question is this: If there are
some investment opportunities and if FDI is reduced, is foreign borrowing
the alternative route through which foreign capital can be tapped?
This line of reasoning would be more convincing if it could be shown that
the other factors that encourage FDI reduce foreign loans whereas those
factors that discourage FDI cause an increase in foreign loans. I suggested
this at the conference, and Wei and Wu now provide explicit evidence in the
postconference version of their paper. Because the coeﬃcients of these ad-
ditional regressions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, this test does
not strengthen the conviction in the Wei-Wu mechanism.
It is nevertheless hard to think of an alternative theory that explains the
other features of the Wei-Wu regressions. Although there may in principle
be other explanations and other variables that ought to be considered, I do
not have any speciﬁc suggestions. I believe that this paper has provided a
very useful framework for thinking about the potential impact of corrup-
tion on FDI and foreign loans. The burden of proof is now on anybody who
would argue that corruption does not discourage FDI and encourage the
inﬂow of foreign loans.
I have two final thoughts about the implications of this paper. First, it
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son to reduce corruption. That reason seems to be a valid one, but of course
a country should not need that as a reason to reduce corruption. Reducing
corruption is something that countries should do for many other reasons.
Second, the key to greater ﬁnancial stability emphasized in this paper is
not corruption per se but foreign loans and other short-term capital. A
country that wants to reduce the risk of crisis can do so even if it cannot at-
tract FDI (either because of corruption of because of other qualities of the
country) by avoiding such large inﬂows of short-term loans and other ﬁ-
nancial liabilities.
Discussion Summary
Roberto Rigobonproposed a diﬀerent view of the ﬁndings of the paper—the
corporate ﬁnance view on the composition of ﬁnancing. According to the
corporate ﬁnance view, he said, there are two additional channels through
which corruption may aﬀect the choice of ﬁnancing. That is, when asset re-
turns or the ability of managers is highly uncertain, investors tend to choose
loan ﬁnancing rather than FDI. If corruption increases the variability of the
ability of managers or the assets’ returns, he said, then more corrupt coun-
tries will have a greater share of loan ﬁnancing, as the paper ﬁnds.
On the empirical part of the paper, Linda S. Goldberg made two com-
ments. The ﬁrst is related to the cross-sectional approach of the paper. The
authors regressed the average ratio of the diﬀerent types of foreign ﬁnanc-
ing between 1994 and 1996 on a country-speciﬁc corruption index plus a
number of other control variables. Goldberg said that the regressions show
the correlation between these variables, but they do not necessarily mean
that the causality is from the corruption to the choice of foreign ﬁnancing.
For example, the correlation could be due to the fact that some other coun-
try-speciﬁc institutions aﬀect the foreign ﬁnancing and these institutions
are highly correlated with the corruption index used in the paper.
Moreover, Goldberg said that in order to answer a more interesting ques-
tion—that is, how a change of the corruption level in a country would aﬀect
its FDI relative to other forms of capital inﬂow—one needs to regress the
changes in the share of FDI on the changes of corruption. This kind of
time-series panel regression would net out other country-speciﬁc eﬀects
that could not be controlled for. Kristin J. Forbesraised a similar suggestion
on running panel regressions and controlling for country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Federico Sturzenegger shared a similar concern. He used a story to illus-
trate that Argentina’s government and its regulatory bodies care little about
the protection of minority shareholders. As a result, he said, many foreign
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stock market when they invest in Argentina. The lack of protection of mi-
nority shareholders may have led to an increase in FDI relative to portfolio
investment. He concluded that if corruption is correlated with weak ﬁnan-
cial institutions, then the corruption variable in the regression could cap-
ture this eﬀect.
Simon Johnson said that many studies have shown that it is very diﬃcult
to distinguish diﬀerent measures of institutions. The corruption eﬀects
found in the paper could be interpreted as the eﬀects of institutions in gen-
eral, which interpretation would also make the paper more appealing.
Moreover, he said, the instruments for corruption used in the paper are
measures of institutions and could be correlated with ﬁnancing for many
diﬀerent reasons. He suggested that the authors try alternative measures of
corruption, such as measures of how institutions have developed histori-
cally.
Rigobon proposed the addition of “ﬁnancial development” as a control
variable to account for the fact that at diﬀerent stages of banking sector de-
velopment there are diﬀerent instruments in the banking sector. Charles W.
Calomiris suggested that the authors look deeper into the relationship be-
tween the dependency on bank lending and the special protection that bank
lending enjoys. Johnson questioned the inclusion of GDP per capita as an
explanatory variable because GDP per capita itself is aﬀected by the insti-
tutional variables, and this could lead to biased estimates of the eﬀects of
corruption. On the interpretation of the results, Forbes asked about the
magnitude of the eﬀects of corruption on capital ﬂows.
Sebastian Edwardssuggested that the authors present more details on the
corruption index to show the distribution and dynamics of this variable be-
cause its deﬁnition is not very clear. For example, he said, the transparency
index used in the paper is a ranking of countries from the least to the most
corrupt ones. Over time, as more countries were added to the sample, their
rankings changed for reasons not related to corruption.
A few people raised concerns on the hypothesis of the paper that in a
more corrupt country foreign capital inﬂows tend to take the form of loan
ﬁnancing. Intuitively, the paper argues that foreign banking lending re-
quires less contact with the local bureaucrats and thus is less subject to the
local corruption. Carlos A. Végh suggested that the authors lay out a more
solid analytical framework, because the current model basically assumes
the hypothesis rather than providing a rationale for it. Moreover, Végh said
that to make a portfolio investment, foreign investors also need to interact
with the locals, so it is not clear which ﬁnancing—FDI or portfolio invest-
ment—is subject to more corruption. The model could also incorporate the
fact that bank portfolio investment is more likely to be bailed out than FDI
by either the government or international institutions, such as the IMF.
Michael P. Dooleyraised a similar concern and said that FDI could be used
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of the investment. Thus, it could potentially be a choice of foreign ﬁnancing
in a very corrupt system.
Nouriel Roubini commented that “corruption” and “crony capitalism”
were used interchangeably in the paper, but these two terms do not always
mean the same thing and should be distinguished. The ﬁndings of the pa-
per—highly corrupt countries have higher share of loan ﬁnancing—could
be due to the dominance of the banking sector in emerging markets, which
leads to a high ratio of loan ﬁnancing. Roubini also suggested that the au-
thors study the outliers in the sample. China, he said, could be an outlier
with a high level of corruption and a high ratio of FDI. This may happen
because foreign direct investors also get advantages, such as monopoly
power, tax deduction, and the like, by bribing the local government.
On the meaning of the corruption variable, Shang-Jin Wei agreed with
the general discussion. He said that he used “corruption” as shorthand to
refer to weak public institutions and that it has many dimensions to it. He
also said that there are attempts to give separate scores to corruption and
other dimensions of institutions, but these scores are always highly corre-
lated with each other.
On the suggestions to conduct panel regressions, Wei said that they are
desirable, but not feasible at this time. The reason is that there is not much
variation in the corruption index over time, and the time series data on cor-
ruption are not reliable. He puts more trust in the cross-country variation
of this index. For example, he said, the corruption index of Indonesia wors-
ened substantially after the fall of Suharto.
On the magnitude of the eﬀect of corruption, Wei cited one of his earlier
papers. He found that an increase of the corruption from the level of Sin-
gapore (very low) to that of Mexico (very high) has the same magnitude
eﬀect on FDI as an increase of the marginal corporate tax rate by about 50
percentage points.
Regarding Roubini’s remark on outliers, Wei showed the partial correla-
tion of the corruption index and the share of FDI where there is no obvious
outlier. Moreover, Wei cited one of his papers to show that China is not an
exception to the rule, and that Chinese FDI could have been much higher
had China managed to reduce its corruption.
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